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Abstract—The key-leakage-storage region is derived for a
generalization of a classic two-terminal key agreement model.
The additions to the model are that the encoder observes a
hidden, or noisy, version of the identifier, and that the encoder
and decoder can perform multiple measurements. To illustrate
the behavior of the region, the theory is applied to binary
identifiers and noise modeled via binary symmetric channels.
In particular, the key-leakage-storage region is simplified by
applying Mrs. Gerber’s lemma twice in different directions to
a Markov chain. The growth in the region as the number of
measurements increases is quantified. The amount by which the
privacy-leakage rate reduces for a hidden identifier as compared
to a noise-free (visible) identifier at the encoder is also given. If
the encoder incorrectly models the source as visible, it is shown
that substantial secrecy leakage may occur and the reliability of
the reconstructed key might decrease.
Index Terms—Information theoretic privacy, physical unclon-
able functions, hidden source model, Mrs. Gerber’s lemma.
I. INTRODUCTION
B IOMETRIC identifiers can be used to authenticate oridentify a user, and to generate secret keys [2]. Similarly,
physical identifiers such as fine variations of ring oscillator
(RO) outputs produce device “fingerprints” that can authenti-
cate a device and generate keys [3]–[5]. For instance, physical
unclonable functions (PUFs) are physical identifiers that are
cheaper and safer alternatives to key storage in non-volatile
memories [6], [7]. Replacing biometric or physical identifiers,
e.g., if the fingerprint is stolen, is often not possible [8] or
might require reconfigurable identifier designs [9]. Replaced
physical identifiers may have correlated outputs with previous
identifiers due to surrounding logic [10]. One should, there-
fore, limit the information leaked about the identifier outputs,
as well as the information leaked about the secret key.
Consider the key agreement model introduced in [11] and
[12] where two terminals observe dependent random variables
and have access to a public communication link; an eaves-
dropper observes the messages, called helper data, transmitted
over this link. We consider a generated-secret (GS) model and
a chosen-secret (CS) model. For the GS model, an encoder
extracts a key from the source, while for the CS model a key
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that is independent of the source is given to the first terminal.
The information through helper data about the secret key,
called the secrecy leakage, should be negligible. The infor-
mation leaked about the identifier, called the privacy leakage,
should be minimized so that an eavesdropper cannot obtain
information about a secret key stored by another encoder that
uses the same or a correlated identifier.
The secret-key vs. privacy-leakage, or key-leakage, regions
for the two models are given in [8] and [13]. In addition to the
secret-key and privacy-leakage rates, it is important to consider
the amount of storage in the public link that is required for
the decoder to reliably reconstruct the secret key [14]. The
storage rate is generally equal to the privacy-leakage rate when
we consider the GS model. Similarly, for the CS model, the
storage rate is generally equal to the sum of the secret-key
and privacy-leakage rates. The storage rate is different from
the privacy-leakage rate for general (non-negligible) secrecy-
leakage levels [15], unlike for the negligible secrecy-leakage
rate constraint considered in [8] and [13]. We show that the
storage and privacy-leakage rates are different also when the
identifier is a remote or hidden source [16, p. 118], [17, p. 78].
Secret-key based user or device authentication with a
privacy-leakage constraint is considered in [18]. There is an
assumption in [18] that the eavesdropper has side information
correlated with the identifier outputs, which is reasonable
for biometric identifiers because they are continuously avail-
able for attacks. However, physical identifiers like PUFs are
used for on-demand key reconstruction. Invasive attacks on
PUFs also permanently change the identifier output [7], so
we assume that the eavesdropper cannot obtain information
correlated with the PUF output. Key agreement with correlated
side information at the eavesdropper has been studied in [19]–
[21].
A. Motivation
Multiple measurements of biometric or physical identifiers
at the decoder can substantially decrease the privacy-leakage
and storage rates because less side information is required to
reconstruct the secret key as compared to a single measure-
ment. One obtains a diversity gain, corresponding to a gain
in reliability, to combat erroneous measurements by averaging
over different channels. One can also exploit the additional
degrees of freedom by increasing the extracted secret-key size.
The latter gain can be viewed as a multiplexing gain, in anal-
ogy to multiple antenna systems for wireless communications.
Such gains in the achievable key-leakage rates are illustrated in
[1] when there are multiple noisy measurements of the source
at the decoder.
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QX
(S,M) = Enc1(X˜
N )
PY |X
PX˜|X
Sˆ = Dec1
(
Y N ,M
)M
XN Y N
X˜N
S Sˆ
Fig. 1. The GS model where a secret key is generated from a noisy identifier
measurement.
The above models assume that the encoder measures the
“true” source. We propose that the true source, i.e., the ground
truth, is instead hidden from the encoder and the encoder
measures a noisy version of the source (see also discussions in
[3] on key-binding with a hidden identifier, [22] where a hid-
den source is considered for authentication, and [23, Sec. II]
for indirect rate-distortion problems with action-dependent
side information). For example, many secrecy systems require
multiple measurements at the encoder to obtain the “noise-
free” output. As a second example, different systems may
generate different sequences from the same identifier.
Consider multiple encoders with independent channels from
the hidden source to the corresponding encoder measurements.
This is a valid scenario for biometric and physical identifiers
due to differences in the environmental conditions when ex-
tracting secret keys by different encoders. An eavesdropper
who wants to seize a secret key can use the information
available from other encoders about the hidden source, which
leads to privacy-leakage with respect to the hidden source
rather than the noisy encoder measurements.
B. Models for Identifier Outputs
We study the physical and biometric identifier outputs that
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according
to a probability distribution with a discrete alphabet. These
models are reasonable if one uses transform-coding algo-
rithms, as in [24], to extract almost i.i.d. bits from PUFs under
varying environmental conditions. Similar transform-coding
based algorithms have been applied to biometric identifiers
to obtain independent output symbols [25].
C. Summary of Contributions and Organization
We extend the model of [8] and [13] to include multiple
noisy identifier measurements at the encoder and decoder. A
summary of the main contributions is as follows.
• We derive the key-leakage-storage regions for the GS and
CS models with a hidden source; see Figs. 1 and 2 for the
corresponding models. Our rate regions recover several
results in the literature, including various results for a vis-
ible source without eavesdropper side information in [8],
[11]–[14]. We further recover our previous results from
QX
M = Enc2(X˜
N , S)
PY |X
PX˜|X
Sˆ = Dec2
(
Y N ,M
)M
XN Y N
X˜N
S Sˆ
Fig. 2. The CS model where a secret key is given to the encoder together
with a noisy identifier measurement.
[1] that studied the visible source model, as discussed in
Section III.
• We evaluate the rate region for a binary hidden source
with multiple measurements at the decoder and a single
noisy measurement at the encoder by applying Mrs.
Gerber’s lemma (MGL) [26]. The analysis differs from
[8] and [13] because we need to apply MGL twice in
different directions to a Markov chain rather than once.
For measurement channels with a certain symmetry, we
find the optimal auxiliary random variable for coding.
• We show that a significant amount of secrecy might be
leaked, and the reliability of the reconstructed key might
decrease, if the visible source model is mistakenly used
for multiple decoder measurements of a hidden source.
Such a mistake leads to violations of the security and
reliability constraints.
• Gains from having multiple measurements at the encoder
are also illustrated. We show that gains in the secret-key
rate can come at a large cost of storage.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe
our problem and develop the key-leakage-storage regions for
the GS and CS models. The key-leakage-storage region of
a binary hidden source with multiple measurements at the
decoder is derived in Section III. In Section IV, we illustrate
gains when using the hidden source model as compared to
the visible one and depict the maximum secret-key rates
achieved by having multiple encoder and decoder measure-
ments. Achievability proofs and converses for the derived rate
regions are given in Sections V and VI, respectively.
D. Notation
Upper case letters represent random variables and lower
case letters their realizations. Superscripts denote a string of
variables, e.g., XN =X1 . . . Xi . . . XN , and subscripts denote
the position of a variable in a string. A random variable X
has probability distribution QX or PX . Calligraphic letters
such as X denote sets; set sizes are written as |X | and
set complements are denoted as X c. T N (QX) denotes the
set of length-N letter-typical sequences with respect to the
probability distribution QX and the positive number  [27,
Ch. 3], [28]. Hb(x)=−x log x−(1−x) log(1−x) is the binary
GU¨NLU¨ AND KRAMER: PRIVACY, SECRECY, AND STORAGE WITH MULTIPLE NOISY MEASUREMENTS OF IDENTIFIERS 3
entropy function and H−1b (·) denotes its inverse with range
[0, 0.5]. The ∗-operator is defined as p∗x=p(1−x)+(1−p)x.
Unif [1 :N ] denotes the uniform distribution over the integers
1, 2, . . . , N . The ⊕-operator denotes modulo-2 summation.
II. SYSTEM MODELS AND RATE REGIONS
A. System Models
Consider a discrete memoryless source that generates i.i.d.
symbols XN from a finite set X according to a probabil-
ity distribution QX . Identifier outputs are noisy due to, for
instance, cuts on a finger. The noise at the encoder and
decoder is modeled as memoryless channels PX˜|X and PY |X ,
respectively. The outputs of PX˜|X and PY |X are, respectively,
the strings X˜N with realizations from a finite set X˜N , and
Y N with realizations from a finite set YN . We thus have
PX˜NXNY N (x˜
N , xN , yN )
=
N∏
i=1
PX˜|X(x˜i|xi)QX(xi)PY |X(yi|xi). (1)
The distributions PX˜|X and PY |X are assumed to be known
for now, although we later study what happens if the encoder
treats X˜N as the true source.
In the GS model depicted in Fig. 1, an encoder sees
X˜N and generates a secret key S and helper data M
as (S,M) =Enc1(X˜N ), where Enc1(·) is an encoder map-
ping. The decoder estimates the key as Sˆ=Dec1(Y N,M),
where Dec1(·) is a decoder mapping. In the CS model
shown in Fig. 2, S is independent of (XN , X˜N , Y N )
and an encoder mapping Enc2(·) generates the helper data
as M =Enc2(X˜N , S). The decoder estimates the key as
Sˆ=Dec2(Y
N ,M), where Dec2(·) is a decoder mapping.
A (secret-key, privacy-leakage, storage) rate triple
(Rs, Rl, Rm) is achievable if, given any δ >0, there is some
N ≥ 1, an encoder, and a decoder for which Rs = log |S|
N
and
Pr[S 6= Sˆ] ≤ δ (reliability) (2)
1
N
I (S;M) ≤ δ (weak secrecy) (3)
1
N
I
(
XN ;M
) ≤ Rl + δ (privacy) (4)
1
N
H(S) ≥ Rs − δ (uniformity) (5)
1
N
H(M) ≤ Rm + δ (storage). (6)
The key-leakage-storage region is the closure of the set of
achievable rate tuples. We refer to models where X˜N = XN
as visible source models (VSMs) and other cases as hidden
source models (HSMs).
B. Key-leakage-storage Regions
We present the key-leakage-storage regions for the GS and
CS models in Theorems 1 and 2, respectively. The proofs of
the theorems are given in Sections V-VI. We derive cardinality
bounds for the auxiliary random variable in Appendix A.
Using standard arguments, one can establish the convexity of
the rate regions, i.e., there is no need for convexification via
a time-sharing random variable.
Theorem 1. The key-leakage-storage region for the GS model
is
R1=
⋃
P
U|X˜
{
(Rs, Rl, Rm) : 0 ≤ Rs ≤ I(U ;Y ),
Rl ≥ I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y ),
Rm ≥ I(U ; X˜)− I(U ;Y )
}
(7a)
where PUX˜XY = PU |X˜ · PX˜|X ·QX · PY |X . (7b)
Theorem 2. The key-leakage-storage region for the CS model
is
R2=
⋃
P
U|X˜
{
(Rs, Rl, Rm) : 0 ≤ Rs ≤ I(U ;Y ),
Rl ≥ I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y ),
Rm ≥ I(U ; X˜)
}
(8a)
where PUX˜XY = PU |X˜ · PX˜|X ·QX · PY |X . (8b)
Remark. The Markov conditions in (7b) and (8b) state that
U−X˜−X−Y forms a Markov chain. One may restrict the
cardinality of the auxiliary random variable U to |U|≤|X˜ |+2
for both theorems.
Remark. The converses for Theorems 1 and 2 permit random-
ization at the encoder (see (54)(b) and (57)(b)) and decoder
(see (51)(a)). Since achievability requires no randomization,
we may use deterministic encoders and decoders. The achiev-
ability of R2 follows directly from the achievability of R1 by
using the key S of the GS model as a key of a one-time pad
to secure a chosen key and storing the output at rate I(U ;Y ).
We recover the previous results in [8] and [13] if X˜ =X
in both theorems so that the maximum achievable secret-key
rate I(X˜;Y ) in these regions is at most I(X;Y ), which is
the maximum achievable secret-key rate if the identifier XN
is observed noise-free at the encoder. The minimum achievable
privacy-leakage rate in these regions decreases as compared to
in [8] and [13] because I(U ;X) ≤ I(U ; X˜).
III. BINARY IDENTIFIER MEASUREMENTS
We evaluate the key-leakage-storage regions for a binary
hidden source. The binary random sequence X˜N corresponds
to a single noisy measurement of the binary source XN at the
encoder, and the random sequence Y N1:MD is the output of MD
measurements of XN for MD ≥ 1 at the decoder. We assume
that the inverse channel PX|X˜ is a BSC, an assumption that is
fulfilled if PX is uniform and PX˜|X is a BSC. Moreover, we
assume that the channel PY1:MD |X can be decomposed into
a mixture of BSCs (i.e., binary-input symmetric memoryless
channels [29], [30]), as described in [1] and illustrated below
in Fig. 3 for dependent BSCs. The former constraint lets us
apply MGL to the Markov chain U − X˜ −X; the latter lets
us apply an extension of MGL to the Markov chain U −X −
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Y1:MD . Recall that MGL is based on the result that, for any
0 ≤ p ≤ 1, the function
f(ν) = Hb(p ∗H−1b (ν)) (9)
is convex in ν for 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1 [26].
Evaluating the key-leakage-storage regions corresponds to
maximizing I(U ;Y1:MD ) and minimizing I(U ; X˜) for a fixed
I(U ;X). It thus requires minimizing H(Y1:MD |U) and max-
imizing H(X˜|U) for a fixed H(X|U).
Let p˜i ∈ [0, 0.5] be the smaller transition probability from
U=ui to X = 0 or X = 1 for i∈{1, 2, . . . , |U|}. We have
H(X|U) =
|U|∑
i=1
PU (ui)Hb(p˜i) (10)
H(Y1:MD |U) =
|U|∑
i=1
PU (ui)g(p˜i) (11)
where
g(p˜i) = H(Y1:MD |U = ui). (12)
In the following, we first study dependent BSCs PY1:MD |X ,
which can be decomposed into a mixture of BSCs. We
next discuss the convexity of the function g(H−1b (ν)) in ν
for binary-input channels PY1:MD |X that can be decomposed
into a mixture of BSCs to establish a tight lower bound on
H(Y1:MD |U) if we fix H(X|U). Then, we simplify the key-
leakage-storage regions of binary identifiers measured through
such channels PY1:MD |X .
A. Measurements Through Dependent BSCs
We show that channels with multiple measurements of X
through dependent BSCs can be decomposed into a mixture
of BSCs. For simplicity, consider MD=3 withY1Y2
Y3
=X
11
1
⊕
B1B2
B3
 (13)
where B1, B2, and B3 are mutually dependent binary random
variables that are jointly independent of X . We can decompose
the channel (13) into three BSCs, since we have
PY1Y2Y3|X(y1, y2, y3|x) = PY1Y2Y3|X(y¯1, y¯2, y¯3|x¯) (14)
where x¯=1−x is the one’s complement of x. Define
qy1y2y3 = PY1Y2Y3|X(y1, y2, y3|0). (15)
The decomposed channel is depicted in Fig. 3, where the
subchannel probabilities are
PA(0) = q000 + q111 (16)
PA(1) = q001 + q110 (17)
PA(2) = q010 + q101 (18)
PA(3) = q011 + q100 (19)
and the crossover probabilities are p0 = q111/PA(0), p1 =
q110/PA(1), p2=q101/PA(2), and p3=q100/PA(3).
X
0
1
001
110
010
101
000
111
011
100
Y1Y2Y3
PA(1)
PA(2)
PA(0)
PA(3)
p1 = q110/PA(1)
p2 = q101/PA(2)
p0 = q111/PA(0)
p3 = q100/PA(3)
Fig. 3. MD = 3 dependent BSCs represented as a mixture of BSCs.
More generally, we can decompose a channel with MD de-
pendent BSC measurements into 2MD−1 subchannels each with
output symbols such that one symbol is the one’s complement
of the other symbol. We define
qbMD = PY1:MD |X(b
MD |0) (20)
for the length-MD binary string bMD =b0b1 . . . bMD−1 and
PA(a) = qBin(a)+qBin(a) (21)
where Bin(a) is the one’s complement of Bin(a) for a =
0, 1, . . . , 2MD−1 − 1. The crossover probability of the a-th
subchannel is pa = qBin(a)/PA(a).
B. Mixtures of BSCs
Consider a channel PY1:MD |X with a binary input and MD
binary measurements as output, i.e., the channel has 2MD
possible output symbols. We decompose the channel into
L = 2MD−1 BSCs as described above. We index these BSCs
from 1 to L. Let A = a represent the BSC index chosen by
the channel and let pa be the crossover probability of a-th
subchannel. The conditional decoder-output entropy is
H(Y1:MD |U)
(a)
= H(Y1:MDA|U)
(b)
= H(A) +
|U|∑
i=1
PU (ui)
L−1∑
a=0
PA(a)H(Y1:MD |A = a, U = ui)
(c)
=H(A)+
|U|∑
i=1
PU (ui)
L−1∑
a=0
PA(a)Hb(pa∗H−1b
(
H(X|U=ui)
)
)
=
|U|∑
i=1
PU (ui)
L−1∑
a=0
PA(a)
(
Hb(pa ∗ p˜i)− logPA(a)
)
(22)
where (a) follows because the output symbols determine A,
(b) follows since A is independent of X so that U and A are
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independent, and (c) follows because Hb(pa ∗p) is symmetric
with respect to p = 12 . Using (12) and (22), we have
g(p˜)=
L−1∑
a=0
PA(a)
(
Hb(pa ∗ p˜)−logPA(a)
)
. (23)
Examples of channels that are mixtures of BSCs are the depen-
dent BSCs in Section III-A, the binary erasure channel (BEC)
[31, p. 107], and additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channels with binary phase shift keying (BPSK) signals and
symmetric (e.g., uniform) quantizers [31, p. 108].
The convexity property (9) carries over to channels
PY1:MD |X that can be decomposed into a mixture of BSCs
[29], i.e., the function g(·) in (23) has the property that
g(H−1b (ν)) is convex in ν for 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1. To see this, note
that PA(·) is fixed and the following term in (22)(c)
L−1∑
a=0
PA(a)Hb(pa ∗H−1b (νi)))
where νi = H(X|U = ui), is a weighted sum of convex
functions of νi by MGL. We extend this result below in
Theorem 3 to show that the boundary points of R1 and R2
are achieved by channels PX˜|U that are BSCs.
C. Two Lemmas
Consider a binary-input channel PY1:MD |X . For Theorem 3
below, we use the following two technical lemmas.
Lemma 1. We have
H(Y1:MD |U) ≥ g
(
H−1b
(
H(X|U))). (24)
Proof: Since g(H−1b (ν)) is convex in ν, by Jensen’s
inequality we have
H(Y1:MD |U) =
|U|∑
i=1
PU (ui)g
(
H−1b
(
Hb(p˜i)
))
≥ g
(
H−1b
( |U|∑
i=1
PU (ui)Hb(p˜i)
))
.
Lemma 2. There is a unique p˜∗ in the interval [0, 0.5] for
which H(X|U) = Hb(p˜∗) = ν.
Proof: The function Hb(·) is strictly increasing from 0
to 1 in the interval [0, 0.5). We further have 0≤H(X|U)≤
H(X)≤1.
D. Simplified Rate Region Characterizations
We now simplify the key-leakage-storage regions for the
measurement channels PX˜|X and PY1:MD |X considered above
so that a single parameter characterizes the regions.
Theorem 3. Suppose PX|X˜ is a BSC with crossover proba-
bility p, where 0 ≤ p ≤ 0.5, and PY1:MD |X is a mixture of
BSCs. The boundary points of R1 and R2 are achieved by
channels PX˜|U that are BSCs.
Proof: Consider the boundary points of R1
(Rs, Rl, Rm)=
(
I(U ;Y1:MD),
I(U ;X)−I(U ;Y1:MD),
I(U ; X˜)−I(U ;Y1:MD)
)
.
For a fixed H(X|U), we obtain
I(U ;Y1:MD )≤ H(Y1:MD )−g
(
H−1b (H(X|U))
)
(25)
and
I(U ;X)−I(U ;Y1:MD )
≥H(X)−H(X|U)−H(Y1:MD)+g
(
H−1b (H(X|U))
)
(26)
and
I(U ; X˜)−I(U ;Y1:MD )
≥ H(X˜)−Hb
(
H−1b (H(X|U))− p
1− 2p
)
−H(Y1:MD )
+ g
(
H−1b (H(X|U))
)
(27)
where we used Lemma 1 to bound H(Y1:MD |U), and the
MGL result in (9) with ν = H(X˜|U) to bound H(X˜|U).
By choosing PU |X˜ such that PX˜|U is a BSC with crossover
probability
x˜ =
H−1b (H(X|U))− p
1− 2p (28)
where x˜ ∈ [0, 0.5], we achieve the right-hand sides of (25)-
(27) since assigning H(X˜|U) = Hb(x˜) achieves equality in
(9) and (24) for the given channels. By Lemma 2, this x˜ is
the unique solution. The proof for R2 is similar.
The convexity property for a BSC, used in MGL, is ex-
tended to any binary channel PY1|X by Witsenhausen in [32],
by Wyner as a remark in [32, Sec. III], and also by Ahslwede
and Ko¨rner in [33]. Therefore, the channels PY1:MD |X that
can be decomposed into a mixture of binary channels also
satisfy the convexity property. This result follows because
the function g(·) for such channels, obtained from (12), also
consists of a constant part and a weighted sum of functions
that are convex in νi.
Remark. In [1, Theorem 1], we claimed that for a mixture
PY1:MD |X of binary channels, we achieve the boundary points
of R1 and R2 when X˜N = XN by using channels PX|U that
are BSCs. It turns out that this claim is valid for mixtures
PY1:MD |X of BSCs, but not necessarily otherwise. The reason
is that one cannot necessarily achieve equality in [1, (25)
and (26)]. This is illustrated in Appendix B for a binary
asymmetric channel.
IV. MODEL COMPARISONS
A. Hidden Source Model
We study the GS model with a hidden binary symmetric
source (BSS) such that QX(0) = QX(1) = 0.5. Suppose
PX˜|X is a BSC with crossover probability pE and PY1:MD |X
consists of MD independent BSCs each with crossover prob-
ability pD. The inverse channel PX|X˜ is also a BSC with
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Fig. 4. Storage-leakage projection of the boundary triples for the GS model
with pD =0.10.
crossover probability pE due to source symmetry. Due to the
independence assumption for MD BSCs, the probabilities of
sequences y1:MD with the same Hamming weight are equal.
Therefore, the decoder-output entropy is
H(Y1:MD ) =
MD∑
k=0
Pr[MD∑
m=1
Ym=k
]
× log2
((
MD
k
)/
Pr
[
MD∑
m=1
Ym=k
]) (29)
where
Pr
[
MD∑
m=1
Ym=k
]
=
(
MD
k
)(
p¯MD−kD p
k
D+p¯
k
Dp
MD−k
D
2
)
. (30)
By Theorem 3, the crossover probability x˜, as in (28), of the
BSC PX˜|U is the only parameter required to characterize R1
for the considered source and channels. Thus, using Theo-
rem 3, the conditional entropy H(Y1:MD |U) can be calculated
similarly as in (29) by using the weighted sum in (30) with
the weights p˜ = p˜1 = p˜2 and 1 − p˜, defined in Section III,
instead of 12 .
B. Mismatched Code Design
The encoder, e.g., a hardware manufacturer (for PUFs) or a
trusted entity (for biometrics), models the source as visible or
hidden, and a code is then constructed for the assumed model.
Therefore, the assumed model determines the performance of
the actual system. In the literature, the physical and biometric
identifiers are modeled by the VSM; see, e.g., [8], [13], [34],
[35]. We first illustrate that treating the HSM as if it were a
VSM might give pessimistic privacy-leakage rate results for
MD ≥ 1 and over-optimistic secret-key and storage rate results
for MD > 1, which results in unnoticed secrecy leakage and
reduced reliability.
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Fig. 5. Storage-key projection of the boundary triples for the GS model with
pD =0.10.
Consider the crossover probabilities pE ∈ {0.03, 0.10},
which are realistic values for biometric [8] and physical
identifiers [3]. We fix the crossover probability of PYi|X for
i=1, 2, . . . ,MD to pD =0.10. For the supposed VSM, X˜N is
mistakenly considered to be a noise-free source, i.e., pV SME =
0, and the corresponding decoder-output channel PV SM
Y1:MD |X˜
consists of MD independent BSCs each with crossover prob-
ability pE ∗ pD because PY |X˜ is estimated from identifier
measurements. However, the HSM considers an encoder mea-
surement through a BSC with crossover probability pE and
MD independent decoder measurements through BSCs, each
with crossover probability pD. Therefore, the HSM results in a
conditional probability distribution PY1:MD |X˜
that is different
from the supposed VSM distribution PV SM
Y1:MD |X˜
for MD > 1
and in a key-leakage-storage region R1 that is different from
the supposed VSM region RV SM1 for MD ≥ 1. We next
illustrate the rate regions for different numbers of encoder and
decoder measurements with pE and pD values given above.
C. Single Encoder and Multiple Decoder Measurements
The projections of the boundary triples (Rs, Rl, Rm) for
the HSM and VSM onto the (Rm, Rl)-plane and onto the
(Rm, Rs)-plane are depicted in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, respectively,
for different crossover probabilities at the encoder and different
numbers of measurements at the decoder. Every marker on
each curve corresponds to the evaluation of the rate-region
boundaries for a fixed crossover probability x˜ given in (28),
so Figs. 4 and 5 should be considered jointly for analysis.
Recall from (7a) that any smaller Rs and greater Rl and Rm
than the boundary triples are achievable.
At the highest storage-leakage points (R∗m, R
∗
l ) in Fig. 4,
one achieves the maximum secret-key rates R∗s , which corre-
sponds to the highest points in Fig. 5. Moreover, Fig. 4 shows
that if MD=1, for the supposed VSM the privacy-leakage and
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storage rates are equal, and are also equal to the storage rate for
the HSM, and the supposed VSM gives pessimistic privacy-
leakage rate results. Fig. 5 shows that increasing the number of
decoder measurements increases the maximum secret-key rate
R∗s for the HSM and supposed VSM. The R
∗
s of the HSM
and supposed VSM are equal if MD = 1, but the supposed
VSM gives over-optimistic secret-key and storage rate results
for MD > 1. These comparisons show that designing a code
for the supposed VSM can lead to substantial secrecy leakage,
which violates (3), and reliability reduction, which violates (2).
Consider, for instance, the parameters
(
pE = 0.03, pD =
0.10, MD = 35
)
. For the GS and CS models with the HSM,
R∗l is approximately 3 × 10−9 bits/source-bit. The privacy-
leakage rate can thus be made small for both models with
multiple decoder measurements. R∗m is approximately 0.194
bits/source-bit for the GS model, which is smaller than the
0.541 bits/source-bit obtained for MD = 1. We remark that
less storage decreases the hardware cost. It is not possible for
the CS model to give such a small storage rate with multiple
decoder measurements since the key is independent of the
hidden source. Independence of the key results in an additional
storage rate, equal to R∗s that is non-decreasing with respect
to MD, to reliably reconstruct the secret key at the decoder.
One may build intuition about the gains achieved by having
multiple decoder measurements as follows. Since the decoder
sees MD noisy versions Y1:MD of the same hidden source
symbol X , it can “combine” the measurements to form a
less noisy equivalent channel. This is entirely similar to using
maximal ratio combining to obtain a sufficient statistic about
a symbol that is transmitted several times over an AWGN
channel. The resulting gain may thus be interpreted as a
diversity gain.
Figs. 4 and 5 further show that increasing pE decreases R∗s
and R∗l , and increases R
∗
m for the HSM. For instance, consider
the HSM, and fix MD = 1 and the secret-key rate to its
maximum R∗s = 0.320 bits/source-bit achieved for pE = 0.10.
The storage rate for pE = 0.03 is approximately 56.2%
less than the storage rate for pE = 0.10 and their privacy-
leakage rates are equal. Therefore, more reliable encoder-
output channels PX˜|X , i.e., channels with smaller pE values,
achieve better storage rates. Similarly, we can show that more
reliable decoder-output channels PY1:MD |X , i.e., channels with
smaller pD values, improve the rate triples (see also [1, Fig. 5])
due to the independence assumption for encoder and decoder
measurements.
Remark. One can alternatively consider encoder and decoder
measurements through a broadcast channel. An unreliable
channel at the encoder might be desirable for this case if the
decoder-output channel is unreliable, since such correlations
might allow less storage and privacy-leakage, and greater
secret-key rates.
D. Multiple Encoder and Decoder Measurements
Consider the general case with ME ≥ 1 measurements
X˜N1:ME = [X˜1X˜2 . . . X˜ME ]
N
of the hidden source XN at
the encoder for the GS model with the HSM. Suppose each
encoder-output channel PX˜i|X for i = 1, 2, . . . ,ME is an
TABLE I
KEY-LEAKAGE-STORAGE (R∗s , R∗l , R
∗
m) RATE POINTS FOR THE GS
MODEL WITH THE HSM FOR pE =0.03 AND pD =0.10.
(ME ,MD) (R
∗
s , R
∗
l , R
∗
m) bits/source-bit
(1, 1) (0.459, 0.346, 0.541)
(1, 3) (0.707, 0.098, 0.293)
(3, 1) (0.525, 0.458, 1.041)
(3, 3) (0.849, 0.134, 0.717)
independent BSC with crossover probability pE. The maximum
secret-key rate R∗s is achieved by choosing U = X˜1:ME for
R1. We list the (R∗s , R∗l , R∗m) points in Table I for different
numbers of encoder and decoder measurements with pE =0.03
and pD =0.10. Table I shows that the storage rates for multiple
encoder measurements can be greater than 1 bit/source-bit,
which cannot be the case for a single encoder measurement.
Increasing the number ME of encoder measurements to in-
crease the secret-key rate, as listed in Table I, can therefore
come at a large cost of storage and can increase the privacy-
leakage rate.
V. ACHIEVABILITY PROOFS
A. Achievability Proof for Theorem 1
1) Overview: We choose the conditional probabilities
PU |X˜(u|x˜) for all u ∈ U and x˜ ∈ X˜ . We randomly and
independently generate about 2NI(U ;X˜) sequences uN (m, s)
for m = 1, . . . , 2NRm and s = 1, . . . , 2NRs . Consider ap-
proximately 2N(I(U ;X˜)−I(U ;Y )) storage labels m and 2NI(U ;Y )
key labels s, which can be considered as bins. The encoder
finds a uN (m, s) sequence that is jointly typical with the
observed measurement x˜N of the source xN . It then publicly
sends the storage label m to the decoder. The decoder sees
another measurement yN of the source and it determines
the unique uN (m, sˆ) that is jointly typical with yN . Using
standard arguments, one can show that the error probability
Pr[S 6= Sˆ] → 0 as N → ∞. The secrecy-leakage rate is
negligible if there is no error. The privacy-leakage rate is
approximately I(U ;X)−I(U ;Y ), which requires a different
analysis than in [8].
2) Proof: Fix PU |X˜ . Randomly and independently generate
codewords uN (m, s), m = 1, . . . , 2NRm , s = 1, . . . , 2NRs
according to
∏N
i=1 PU (ui), where
PU (ui) =
∑
(x˜,x)∈X˜×X
PU |X˜(ui|x˜)PX˜|X(x˜|x)QX(x). (31)
These codewords define the codebook
C = {uN (m, s),m = 1, . . . , 2NRm , s = 1, . . . , 2NRs}
and we denote the random codebook by
C˜ = {UN (m, s)}(2
NRm ,2NRs )
(m,s)=(1,1) . (32)
Let 0<′<.
Encoding: Given x˜N , the encoder looks for a codeword that
is jointly typical with x˜N , i.e., (uN (m, s), x˜N )∈T N′ (PUX˜). If
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there is one or more such codeword, then the encoder chooses
one of them and puts out (m, s). If there is no such codeword,
set m=s=1. The encoder publicly stores the label m.
Decoding: The decoder puts out sˆ if there is a unique key
label sˆ that satisfies the typicality check (uN (m, sˆ), yN ) ∈
T N (PUY ); otherwise, it sets sˆ=1.
Error Probability: Define the error events
E1 =
{
(UN (m, s), X˜N ) 6∈ T N′ (PUX˜) for all
(m, s)∈ [1 :2NRm ]× [1 :2NRs ]}
E2 =
{
(UN (M, s), X˜N , Y N ) 6∈ T N (PUX˜Y ) for all
s∈ [1 :2NRs ]}
E3 =
{
(UN (M, s′), Y N ) ∈ T N (PUY ) for some s′ 6=S
}
.
and the overall error event E = ∪3i=1Ei. Using the union
bound, we have
Pr[E]≤Pr[E1]+Pr[Ec1 ∩ E2]+Pr[E3]. (33)
Pr[E1] is small with large N and small ′ if
Rm+Rs>I(U ; X˜)+δ(
′) (34)
where δ(′) is small with small ′ (see the covering lemma
[36, Lemma 3.3]).
Note that the event {X˜N = x˜N, UN = uN} implies Y N ∼∏N
i=1 PY |X˜(yi|x˜i). By the conditional typicality lemma [36,
Section 2.5], we obtain that Pr[Ec1 ∩ E2] is small with large
N .
Due to symmetry in the code generation, we can set M=1
and have
Pr[E3]=Pr[(U
N (1, s′), Y N)∈T N (PUY) for some s′ 6=S].
Using the packing lemma [36, Lemma 3.1], we find that
Pr[E3] is small with large N and small  if
Rs<I(U ;Y )−δ() (35)
where δ() is small with small .
We therefore define some δ1 and δ2, where δ2 > δ() and
δ1>δ(
′)+δ2, that are small with small  and some δ′ that is
small with large N and small  such that
Pr[E] ≤ δ′ (36)
Rm = I(U ; X˜)− I(U ;Y ) + δ1 (37)
Rs = I(U ;Y )− δ2. (38)
We first establish bounds on the secrecy-leakage, secret-key,
privacy-leakage, and storage rates averaged over the random
codebook C˜ and then we show that there exists a codebook
satisfying (2)-(6). In the following, UN represents UN (M,S).
Secrecy-leakage Rate: Observe that
H(MS|C˜) (a)= H(UNMS|C˜)
≥ H(UN |C˜)
= H(UN X˜N |C˜)−H(X˜N |UN C˜)
(b)
≥ NH(X˜)−H(X˜N |UN C˜)
(c)
≥ NH(X˜)−N(H(X˜|U) + δ)
= N(I(U ; X˜)−δ)
(d)
= N(Rm+Rs− δ1+δ2−δ) (39)
where
(a) follows because, given the codebook, MS determines UN ,
(b) follows because X˜N is independent of the codebook,
(c) follows by using [37, Lemma 4] for δ that is small with
small ,
(d) follows by (37) and (38).
Using (39), we obtain
1
N
I(S;M |C˜)= 1
N
(H(S|C˜)+H(M |C˜)−H(MS|C˜))
≤ 1
N
(NRs+NRm−H(MS|C˜))
≤ δ1−δ2+δ (40)
which is small with small .
Key Uniformity: We have
1
N
H(S|C˜) ≥ 1
N
(H(MS|C˜)−H(M |C˜))
(a)
≥ Rs− δ1+δ2−δ. (41)
where (a) follows by (39).
Privacy-leakage Rate: First, consider
H(M |XN C˜) = H(MX˜N |XN C˜)−H(X˜N |MXN C˜)
(a)
≥H(X˜N |XN )−H(X˜N |MXN C˜)
(b)
=H(X˜N |XN )−H(X˜NS|MXN C˜)
(c)
≥NH(X˜|X)−H(S|MXN C˜)−H(X˜N |XNUN C˜)
(d)
=NH(X˜|X)−H(S|MXNY N SˆC˜)−H(X˜N |XNUN C˜)
(e)
≥NH(X˜|X)−Pr[E] log|S|−Hb(Pr[E])
−H(X˜N |XNUN C˜)
(f)
=NH(X˜|X)−Nδ′′−H(X˜N |XNUN C˜)
(g)
≥NH(X˜|X)−Nδ′′−N(H(X˜|XU)+δ′)
=N(I(U ; X˜|X)−(δ′′+δ′)) (42)
where
(a) follows because C˜ is independent of X˜NXN ,
(b) follows because, given the codebook, X˜N determines S,
(c) follows since, given the codebook, MS determines Un,
(d) follows by the Markov chain SMUN−X˜N−XN−Y N ,
(e) follows from Fano’s inequality,
(f) follows by using |S|≤|X˜ |N and defining a parameter δ′′
that is small with large N and small  due to (36),
(g) follows by using [37, Lemma 4] for δ that is small with
small .
Using (42), we have
1
N
I(XN ;M |C˜)= 1
N
(H(M |C˜)−H(M |XN C˜))
≤Rm−(I(U ; X˜|X)−(δ′′+δ′))
(a)
=Rm−(H(U |X)−H(U |X˜)−(δ′′+δ′))
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(b)
=I(U ;X)−I(U ;Y )+δ′′+δ′+δ1 (43)
where (a) follows by the Markov chain U−X˜−X and (b)
follows by (37).
Storage Rate: Using (37), we have
1
N
H(M |C˜) ≤ Rm = I(U ; X˜)− I(U ;Y ) + δ1. (44)
Applying the selection lemma [38, Lemma 2.2] to these re-
sults, there exists a codebook for the GS model that approaches
the key-leakage-storage triple
(Rs, Rl, Rm) =
(
I(U ;Y ),
I(U ;X)−I(U ;Y ),
I(U ; X˜)−I(U ;Y )).
B. Achievability Proof for Theorem 2
1) Overview: We use the achievability proof of the GS
model in combination with a one-time pad to conceal the
embedded secret key S by the key S′ generated by the GS
model. The embedded key S is uniformly distributed and
independent of other random variables. The secret-key and
privacy-leakage rates do not change, but the storage rate
I(U ; X˜) is approximately the sum of the storage and secret-
key rates of the GS model.
2) Proof: Suppose S has the same cardinality as S′, i.e.,
|S|= |S ′|. We use the codebook, encoder, and decoder of the
GS model and add the masking layer (one-time pad) approach
of [11] and [8] for the CS model as follows:
M = Enc2(X˜
N , S) = [S′+S,M ′] (45)
Sˆ = Dec2(Y
N ,M) = S′+S−Sˆ′ (46)
where M ′ is the helper data for the GS model, and the addition
and subtraction operations are modulo-|S|.
Error Probability: We have
Pr[S 6= Sˆ] = Pr[S′ 6= Sˆ′] (47)
which is small by (36).
Secrecy-leakage Rate: The helper data M of the CS model
consists of S′+S and the helper data M ′ of the GS model.
Using (40), (41), and since S is independent of S′M ′C˜ and
uniformly distributed, we obtain
1
N
I(S;M ′, S′+S|C˜) ≤ 2(δ1−δ2+δ). (48)
We thus have a secrecy-leakage rate that is small with small
.
Privacy-leakage Rate: Using (43), we have
1
N
I(XN ;M ′, S′+S|C˜)
≤I(U ;X)−I(U ;Y )+δ′′+δ′+δ1 (49)
since S′+S is independent of M ′XN C˜.
Storage Rate: We obtain
1
N
H(M ′, S′+S|C˜)
(a)
≤ Rm + 1
N
H(S′+S)
(b)
= I(U ; X˜)−I(U ;Y )+δ1 +I(U ;Y )−δ2
= I(U ; X˜) + δ1−δ2 (50)
where (a) follows because S′+S is independent of M ′C˜ and
(b) follows by (37) and (38).
Using the selection lemma [38, Lemma 2.2], there exists a
codebook for the CS model that approaches the key-leakage-
storage triple
(Rs, Rl, Rm) =
(
I(U ;Y ),
I(U ;X)−I(U ;Y ),
I(U ; X˜)
)
.
VI. CONVERSES
The converses for Theorems 1 and 2 follow similar steps.
Therefore, we give the proofs of both theorems with different
bounds for the storage rates.
Suppose that for some δ > 0 and N there is an encoder
and a decoder such that (2)-(6) are satisfied for the GS or CS
model by the key-leakage-storage triple (Rs, Rl, Rm). Fano’s
inequality for S and Sˆ gives
NN ≥H(S|Sˆ)
(a)
≥ H(S|MY N ) (51)
where N = δRs +Hb(δ)/N and (a) permits randomized
decoding. Note that N → 0 if δ→ 0. We use (51) to bound
the key, leakage, and storage rates.
Secret-key rate: Using (3), (5), (51), and because Y i−1−
MSXi−1−Yi forms a Markov chain, we obtain
N(Rs−δ)≤ H(S) = I(S;M) + I(S;Y N |M) +H(S|MY N )
≤NH(Y )−
N∑
i=1
H(Yi|MSXi−1)+N(δ+N). (52)
Identify Ui = MSXi−1 in (52) so that Ui−X˜i−Xi−Yi
forms a Markov chain, which follows since PY |X and PX˜|X
are memoryless channels. Introduce a time-sharing random
variable Q ∼ Unif[1 : N ] independent of other random
variables. Define X=XQ, X˜=X˜Q, Y =YQ, and U=(UQ,Q)
so that U−X˜−X−Y forms a Markov chain. Using (52), we
obtain
Rs≤H(Y )− 1
N
N∑
i=1
H(Yi|Ui)+2δ+N
= H(Y )−H(YQ|UQQ)+2δ+N
= I(U ;Y )+2δ+N . (53)
Storage rate: For the GS model, we have
N(Rm+δ)
(a)
≥ H(M) ≥ H(M |Y N )
(b)
≥ H(MSY N )−H(Y N )−H(S|MY N )−H(MS|X˜N )
(c)
≥
[ N∑
i=1
I(MSX˜i−1; X˜i)−I(MSY i−1;Yi)
]
−NN
(d)
≥
[ N∑
i=1
I(MSXi−1; X˜i)−I(MSXi−1;Yi)
]
−NN
=
[ N∑
i=1
I(Ui; X˜i)−I(Ui;Yi)
]
−NN (54)
10 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY
where (a) follows by (6), (b) follows from the encoding step,
(c) follows by (51) and because X˜N and Y N are i.i.d., and
(d) follows by the Markov chains
Y i−1−MSXi−1−Yi (55a)
Xi−1−MSX˜i−1−X˜i. (55b)
Using the definition of U above, we obtain for the GS model
Rm ≥ I(U ; X˜)− I(U ;Y )− (δ+N ). (56)
For the CS model, we have
N(Rm+δ)
(a)
≥ H(M)
= I(MS; X˜N )−H(S|M)+H(MS|X˜N )
(b)
≥ I(MS; X˜N )+I(S;M)
≥
N∑
i=1
I(MSX˜i−1; X˜i)
(c)
≥
N∑
i=1
I(MSXi−1; X˜i)
=
N∑
i=1
I(Ui; X˜i) (57)
where (a) follows by (6), (b) follows because S is independent
of X˜N and from the encoding step, and (c) follows by
applying (55b). Using the definition of U above, we have for
the CS model
Rm ≥ I(U ; X˜)− δ. (58)
Privacy-leakage rate: Observe that
N(Rl+δ)
(a)
≥ I(XN ;M) ≥ H(M |Y N )−H(M |XN )
=H(MSY N )−H(S|MY N )−H(Y N )−H(M |XN )
≥I(MS;XN )−I(MS;Y N )−H(S|MY N )
(b)
≥
[ N∑
i=1
I(MSXi−1;Xi)−I(MSY i−1;Yi)
]
−NN
(c)
≥
[ N∑
i=1
I(MSXi−1;Xi)−I(MSXi−1;Yi)
]
−NN
=
[ N∑
i=1
I(Ui;Xi)−I(Ui;Yi)
]
−NN (59)
where (a) follows by (4), (b) follows by (51), and (c) follows
from the Markov chains in (55a). Using the definition of U
above, we have
Rl ≥ I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y )− (δ+N ). (60)
The converse for Theorem 1 follows by (53), (56), and (60),
and by letting δ→0. The converse for Theorem 2 follows by
(53), (58), and (60), and by letting δ→0.
VII. CONCLUSION
We derived the key-leakage-storage regions for a HSM for
noisy biometric and physical identifiers. For a BSS, we used
MGL to evaluate the key-leakage-storage regions for decoder-
output channels that can be decomposed into a mixture of
BSCs and quantified the improvements in all rates with
multiple measurements at the decoder as compared to a single
measurement. By taking a large number of measurements of
the hidden source at the decoder, the privacy-leakage rate is
made small for the GS and CS models, and the storage rate
is decreased for the GS model, which is not possible for the
CS model. We showed that if one mistakenly uses the VSM
when the source is hidden, the privacy-leakage rate might be
pessimistic, whereas the secret-key and storage rates might be
over-optimistic, which leads to unnoticed secrecy leakage and
reliability reductions. The points that achieve the maximum
secret-key rates in the key-leakage-storage regions for multiple
encoder measurements show that the gain in the secret-key
rate from multiple encoder measurements results in greater
privacy-leakage and significantly greater storage rates.
The examples illustrated that higher reliability in the en-
coder measurements improves the storage rate, which also
applies to decoder measurements because the encoder and
decoder measurements are obtained through separate chan-
nels. In future work, we plan to consider key-leakage-storage
regions for encoder and decoder measurements through a
broadcast channel, and to show that reduced reliability in the
measurements might enlarge the key-leakage-storage region
for this case.
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APPENDIX A
CARDINALITY BOUND
Consider X˜ = {x˜1, x˜2, . . . ,x˜|X˜ |} and the following |X˜ |+2
real-valued continuous functions on the connected compact
subset P of all probability distributions on X˜ :
fj(PX˜) =

PX˜(x˜j) for j = 1, 2, . . . , |X˜ |−1
H(X) for j = |X˜ |
H(X˜) for j = |X˜ |+ 1
H(Y ) for j = |X˜ |+ 2.
(61)
By using the support lemma [16, Lemma 15.4], we find
that there is a random variable U ′ taking at most |X˜ |+ 2
values such that PX˜ , H(X˜), H(X|U), H(X˜|U), and H(Y |U)
are preserved if we replace U with U ′. We preserve the joint
distribution PX˜XY (x˜, x, y)=PX˜(x˜)PX|X˜(x|x˜)PY |X(y|x) by
preserving PX˜(x˜), so the entropies H(X) and H(Y ) are also
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preserved. Hence, the expressions in Theorems 1 and 2
I(U ;Y )=H(Y )−H(Y |U)
I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y )=H(X)−H(X|U)−H(Y )+H(Y |U)
I(U ; X˜)−I(U ;Y )=H(X˜)−H(X˜|U)−H(Y )+H(Y |U)
I(U ; X˜)=H(X˜)−H(X˜|U)
are preserved by some U ′ that satisfies the Markov condition
U−X˜−X−Y with |U ′| ≤ |X˜ |+ 2.
APPENDIX B
ON A LOWER BOUND FOR BINARY ASYMMETRIC
CHANNELS
Consider a Markov chain U −X −Y1, a binary random
variable X with the probability distribution QX , and a binary
channel PY1|X with probability transition matrix
T =
a 1− a
b 1− b
 (62)
which is asymmetric if a+b 6= 1. One can restrict attention
to the cases a+ b ≤ 1 and a ≥ b by swapping the outputs
and inputs, respectively, if necessary [32]. The conditional
entropies H(X|U) and H(Y1|U) are as defined in (10) and
(11), respectively. Since the convexity property is satisfied
for all binary channels PY1|X (see Section III), we have the
following lower bound due to Lemma 1:
H(Y1|U)
≥Hb
(
aH−1b (H(X|U))+b
(
1−H−1b (H(X|U))
))
. (63)
Note that if a = b, then (63) does not depend on H(X|U),
since the channel would then have zero capacity.
Consider the achievability of the bound in (63) for the model
considered in [1, Theorem 1], where a ternary U suffices to
evaluate the key-leakage-storage region. For a channel PX|U
with probability transition matrix
Tu =

au 1− au
bu 1− bu
cu 1− cu
 (64)
and i∈{1, 2, . . . , |U|}, we obtain
H(X|U) = PU (u0)Hb(au)+PU (u1)Hb(bu)
+PU (u2)Hb(cu) (65)
H(Y1|U) = PU (u0)Hb(aau+b(1−au))
+ PU (u1)Hb(abu+b(1−bu))
+ PU (u2)Hb(acu+b(1−cu)) (66)
where PU (u2)=1−PU (u0)−PU (u1) and
PU (u1)=
PX(0)−cu−PU (u0)(au−cu)
bu−cu . (67)
Fig. 6 shows the possible (H(X|U), H(Y1|U)) pairs by
assigning an appropriate set of values to the first column of
Tu and to PU (u0) for a uniform X and an asymmetric binary
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Fig. 6. Comparison of the lower bound and possible choices of U for a
uniform input and a binary channel PY1|X with parameters a = 0.4 and
b=0.2 in (62).
channel PY1|X with parameters a=0.4 and b=0.2. The lower
bound in Fig. 6 is thus not tight for such an asymmetric binary
channel. Our simulations suggest that this is the case for all
asymmetric channels, except for special cases like a=b.
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